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FOREWORD 
The OECD Secretariat has commissioned this report in order to test indicators and assess the roles of 
platform competition, pricing, geography, policy and regulation in the deployment and take-up of 
broadband and to assist in understanding how these help to explain the differences in broadband 
penetration across OECD economies. There are several empirical studies on OECD broadband penetration 
rates that precede the current paper. Much of the recent empirical work has aimed at understanding the role 
of local loop unbundling in driving broadband penetration rates. This paper provides more evidence in the 
debate on the role of policy and competition in broadband uptake. The paper is by John de Ridder, 
Telecommunications Economist, and does not necessarily reflect the official views of the Organisation or 
of the governments of its member countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© OECD/OCDE 2007. 
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CATCHING-UP IN BROADBAND  WHAT WILL IT TAKE? 
1.  Introduction  
Governments increasingly place a high priority on the availability of competitive broadband 
infrastructure and look to international benchmarks as one input to assess progress in meeting their policy 
objectives. These benchmarks include broadband penetration, pricing, availability and speeds. But, the 
benchmark most frequently cited is broadband penetration and this is the measure driving policy initiatives 
in many developed countries. In May 2006, for example, New Zealand cited its ranking in OECD 
broadband penetration as a factor in taking the decision to unbundle the local loop.  
Can governments elevate their broadband performance rankings?  This paper aims to identify the 
factors that are significant in driving broadband penetration. It develops and tests indicators to assess the 
roles of platform competition, pricing, geography, policy and regulation in the deployment and take-up of 
broadband and to assist in understanding how these help to explain the differences in broadband 
penetration across OECD economies.  
2. Background  
The broadband market is still at an early stage of its development and definitions of broadband are 
shifting as technologies improve and customer expectations rise. This paper seeks to explain the broadband 
adoption rates across countries reported by the OECD.1 
There are several empirical studies on OECD broadband penetration rates that precede the current 
paper. Some of these are summarised in Table 1 alongside the findings of this paper. A Yes is reported in 
the table where the study reports the relevant variable to be statistically significant in explaining broadband 
penetration. These findings are discussed further below.    
Much of the recent empirical work has aimed at understanding the role of local loop unbundling in 
driving broadband penetration rates (Garcia-Murillo & Gabel, 2003; Wallsten, 2006; Howell, 2006; 
Distaso et al., 2006).  This paper provides more evidence in the debate on the role of policy and 
competition in broadband uptake. 
Descriptions of the model and data are presented in Sections 3 and 4. The presentation of estimates of 
the demand, supply and composite equations across three related data sets follows in Sections 5, 6, and 7. 
Suggestions for further research and policy implications conclude the paper.  
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Table 1: Drivers of broadband penetration in the OECD 
Study Bauer Cava-F. & Wallsten Grosso Garcia-M Turner
et al Alabau-M. & Gabel
Period 2005 2003/05 2001 2000-02 1999-03 2001-04 2001 2005
N= 30 54 30 27-90(3) 179 117 36 (2) 30
Demand
Income No No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age No Yes
Education No No  No No
Price of broadband Yes Yes No No Yes No
Price of dial-up Internet Yes Yes No
Addressable market Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather No No
Content No No
Supply
Urbanisation Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes No
Competition No Yes(4) No No Yes No
Unbundling Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Best adjusted R-squared 0.85 0.86 0.46 0.41 0.35 0.98 0.91 0.58
De Ridder (1)
 
Notes:    (1) Results presented in this paper. Other studies cited in references below. 
 (2) ITU data but the sample of 36 is likely to be dominated by the OECD economies. 
 (3) Based on Tables 4, 5 and 7 which deal with broadband DSL penetration. 
 (4) Differenced data set only. 
3. The model  
Broadband penetration is driven by both and supply factors. The a priori complete model consists of 
three equations:2 
1. QD = f (P, Y, A, E, S, W)   
2. QS = f (P, U, G, C)    
3. QD = QS    
The first two equations are for the demand and supply of broadband penetration. The price of 
broadband (P) appears in both equations. Income (Y), age (A), education (E), the addressable market (S) 
and weather (W) are the exogenous demand drivers. Population density (U), government policy (G) and 
competition (C) are exogenous supply shifters. 
A priori, it is not clear if either the demand or supply equation or both can be estimated. Early 
estimation of demand curves in agricultural products was successful because shifts in the supply curve due 
to weather defined the demand curve. This seems to be the case in broadband too (see Figure 1 showing 
broadband penetration, QTOT, and the broadband price, PTOT); although not because of weather which 
appears in this paper as a demand driver rather than supply shifter. 
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Figure 1. Figure 1: Scatter of Broadband Price and Penetration (December 2005) 
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It is clear from Figure 1 that the relationship between price and broadband penetration is non-linear. 
Scatters of all the main explanatory variables against QTOT are shown in Annexes 1a to 1e. Alternative 
curve fits were tested against every scatter but only price has a non-linear relationship with QTOT and this 
has been purged by taking the natural logarithm of the price variable; as depicted on the right-hand charts 
in Annex 1a.3  
Bauer et al. (2003) recognise that broadband penetration is influenced both by demand and supply 
factors. Their reduced form model approach is followed with the composite equation estimates presented 
below. 
Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006) follow Bauer et al. (2003) in specifying broadband 
demand and supply equations (for DSL and cable separately) but they define their dependent variables in 
the demand and supply equations differently. For DSL, demand is DSL penetration and supply is defined 
as the percentage of DSL-enabled loops4.  The extent to which exchanges have been DSL-enabled seems 
less interesting from a policy perspective than the extent of broadband adoption which is the focus of this 
study.    
The next section explores the data found to represent each of these concepts in the model and explains 
the choice of variables made to estimate the model. 
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4. The data 
There are three data sets: 
• December 2005; which has the widest range of variables for analysis. 
• Panel data; which significantly improves the degrees of freedom and fit. 
• Differenced data; which deals with country fixed effects. 
The panel data comprises the December 2005 data plus December 2002 data. The third data set is the 
result of subtracting the values in the earlier data set from the corresponding values in the December 2005 
data set.  
All the variables described below are available for the December 2005 data set. So, this data set is 
mined to uncover the most useful measures of the variables required for the model. For example, six 
different measures of population density were considered.  
The first level of filtering is consideration of the Pearson bivariate correlation coefficients5 (Table 2). 
Since these measure linear correlations, the price variables are expressed in natural logarithms as discussed 
above. The more promising alternatives were then tested in models estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimation. 
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in estimation are presented in Table 3. For each 
variable, this shows the number of observations (countries), the range of values (minimum and maximum), 
the arithmetic mean and standard deviation.6  The range of values across countries for each variable 
explaining broadband is quite wide which helps provide good estimates.  
4.1  Dependent variable (Q) 
This paper seeks to statistically explain per capita broadband penetration rates at December 2005 and 
2002 as sourced from the OECD. While both DSL and Cable per capita penetration rates are reported by 
the OECD, the focus of this paper is on the total penetration rate, QTOT. This is normally distributed with 
no outliers in the December 2005 data set. But, this is not the case with December 2002 data until Korea is 
eliminated from the sample as an outlier; as noted in section 6 below.7 
4.2  Price variable (P) 
Other studies have had difficulty finding a relationship between broadband prices and broadband 
penetration. This paper is more successful because it uses new price data obtained from the OECD.  
The broadband price per Mbit/s is constructed using a method first suggested by the OECD (2001) 
and refined by the ITU (2003, A-56). It involves a two-step procedure: first, only plans that meet certain 
characteristics (e.g. download speed, data cap of around 1 GB per month and technology) are considered 
and then the best price per 100 kbit/s of advertised download speed is selected from those that remain. In 
this paper, prices and values are expressed at purchasing power parities rather than nominal USD.  
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Figure 2: OECD Broadband Penetration Rates, December 2005 
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Source: OECD 
There are three variants of broadband price tested in this paper: 
• Average price (PTOT) is used only in the December 2005 data set as it is only available for the 
September quarter 2005. OECD data (provided directly to the author) for the prices for DSL and 
Cable were aggregated using the relative line shares of DSL and Cable as weights, 
• PDSL is the DSL price alone taken from the OECD for September 2005 and from the ITU (2003) 
for July 2003. Both PTOT and PDSL are expressed per Mbit/s in USD at purchasing power parities. 
• PREL is PDSL divided by the total price of 20 evening hours per month of dial-up Internet access 
(excluding line rental). The dial-up costs are taken from the ITU (2006, Table 16) for August 
20048 and from the OECD (2003, Table 6.2) for September 2002. 
Price relativity is considered to be potentially important as the most common application of 
Internet access is for e-mail which dial-up satisfies in many cases. There are eight countries 
where this relativity (PREL) is greater than 2.0 and all but Spain have broadband penetration 
(QTOT) under 10% (see Annex 2). In these eight countries, dial-up is so cheap that it impedes the 
adoption of broadband.   
All three price measures are significantly negatively correlated with QTOT (Table 2) with the natural 
log of each price used in estimation to remove their non-linear relationships with QTOT (see Annex 1a). 
Korea is the cheapest on all three measures of price and is second only to Iceland on broadband penetration 
(Annex 2). 
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4.3  Income variable (Y) 
Income is measured as GDP per capita at 2004 and 2001 relative to the United States (YINDEX) and is 
sourced from the OECD.  Some authors use median incomes and even poverty (Turner, 2005) as measures 
of income. As will be seen from the results below, GDP per capita may not be the best measure of income.       
It could be argued that Y is endogenous. That is, that there is two-way causality between Q and Y. 
That may be true in future  it is why governments feel it is important to invest in broadband to increase 
economic prosperity and income. But the cross-section country samples in this study are taken at an early 
stage in the development of broadband. So, any feedback from Q to Y is likely to be very weak or absent at 
this point. 
4.4  Age variable (A) 
Age is measured as the share of the total population aged 35-44 as at 2004 and is used only in the 
December 2005 data set. The numbers by age group are sourced from OECD Labour Force Statistics. This 
source provides seven age cohorts by country (except Mexico). Surprisingly, the 15-35 and 25-34 groups 
were each negatively correlated with broadband penetration (overall and also for ADSL and cable 
separately). The 35-39, 40-44 groups were positively correlated with broadband penetration. Age groups 
over 55 show little correlation either way, as might be expected.  
Table 2: Correlations with broadband penetration (Dec.2005) 
Variable under study: Total broadband penetration (QTOT)
Pearson correlation: < 0.3
Variable Value Variable Value Variable Value Variable
Demand
GDP per capita YINDEX 0.535**
Age AGE 0.385*
Education ETERT 0.650**
EYRS 0.517**
Price (also supply factor) LNPTOT -0.692**
LNPDSL -0.676**
LNPREL -0.710**
Saturation SIP 0.833**
SGTOT -0.706**
SBP 0.587**
SFTD 0.568**
Weather SUN -0.363*
WET 0.348
Supply
Urbanisation UURB 0.552** USKM
Competition CFAC
CCAB
CENT
Policy GUYRS 0.555** GOWN 0.351 GADSL
GUTOT -0.312 GBAR
 
coeff. > 0.5 0.5 > coeff.> 0.4 0.4 >coeff. > 0.3
 
Statistical significance at the 1 and 5% levels denoted by ** and * respectively. 
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4.5  Education variable (E) 
Education measures are for 2003 sourced from the OECD (2005a). The two measures selected for 
exploration in this study are: 
• The average number of years in formal education, EYRS  (OECD, Table 1.4). 
• The share of the population aged 25-64 that has received tertiary education, ETERT (OECD, Table 
1.3a). 
Both seem promising based on previous studies and the correlations reported in Table 2. But since 
EYRS is highly correlated with YINDEX, this paper uses ETERT.9  
The panel data simply repeats the December 2005 data for the second (earlier) period as it is unlikely 
that the values would have shifted much.  
4.6  Saturation variable (S) 
There are four measures of saturation or market potential which are all correlated with QTOT (Table 2): 
• SIP is total Internet subscribers as a percent of population and is the measure chosen for 
estimation. It represents the addressable market which should be positively correlated with 
broadband penetration. OECD data was used for 2002 and ITU data for 2004 unless it was lower 
than the 2003 figure reported by the OECD; in which case the latter was used with population 
data for the same year.10 One exception to this procedure is Portugal where the OECDs implied 
penetration rate of 69% is replaced with 14% sourced from the country regulator (www.icp.pt).  
The variation of SIP across countries (Figure 3) also suggests possible variations in the asymptotic 
limits of their respective broadband adoption curves. The greatest potential for broadband growth 
by substitution of dial-up is in the seven countries where dial-up customers exceed the number of 
broadband customers: led by Denmark and followed by Ireland, Austria, New Zealand, Germany, 
the Czech Republic and Greece. 
Figure 3: Broadband and Internet Penetration, December 2005 
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Source: OECD and ITU. 
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• SGTOT is the ratio of broadband penetration (QTOT) at December 2005 to December 2004. If 
countries climb an S-curve characteristic of new services, a high growth rate will signify a 
lower point on the curve and a low level of penetration.  
• SBP is the share of total Internet subscribers (obtained from the ITU for 2004) accounted for by 
broadband. As much of the demand for broadband comes from the migration of dial-up Internet 
customers, a positive correlation between SBP and broadband penetration should be expected.  
• SFTD is fixed telephone density at 2004. This is a limiting factor in what ADSL per capita 
penetration is possible so it should be positively correlated with broadband penetration. ADSL 
accounts for over 50% of broadband penetration in every country (except for the Czech Republic) 
and averages over 60% across the OECD.   
4.7  Weather variable (W) 
Weather could be a factor explaining Icelands high take-up of broadband. Two annual average 
measures of weather were extracted from monthly data for the capital city in each country:11 
• SUN  is the daily average number of sunlight hours. 
• WET  is the daily average number of wet (over 0.25mm) days. 
Iceland has less days of sun and more days of rain than the sample mean. As expected from the 
hypothesis, QTOT is negatively correlated with SUN and positively correlated with WET and the weather 
variables are highly correlated with each other. SUN is used in estimation, although WET could have been 
used instead. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics (Dec. 2005) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
QTOT 30 1.41 26.66 14.1443 7.91954 
LNPTOT 30 -.16 5.28 2.9749 1.34488 
LNPDSL 30 .07 5.60 3.0736 1.36888 
LNPREL 30 -3.00 2.23 -.1841 1.37475 
YINDEX 30 .17 1.60 .6690 .27462 
AGE 30 23.0 32.1 28.527 1.6954 
ETERT 30 10 44 24.07 9.421 
SIP 30 2.10 51.23 23.7557 12.47569 
SUN 30 3.5 8.3 5.497 1.2995 
UURB 30 56.2 97.2 74.960 11.0733 
CFAC 30 .91 61.47 26.9357 16.92989 
GUYRS 30 0 10 4.97 2.965 
Valid N (listwise) 30      
 
4.8  Urbanisation variable (U) 
Urbanisation and population density are recognised supply factors for broadband penetration. City 
states like Hong Kong, China and Singapore should find it cheaper to wire-up their populations than other 
DSTI/ICCP/CISP(2007)8/FINAL 
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countries. In addition, wiring high-rise buildings has lower unit costs than connecting low rise buildings to 
broadband.  
The separate house on the quarter acre block is the most popular type of dwelling in Australia, making 
up 78.1% of total dwellings in the year to June 2001. Flats, units and apartments accounted for just 11.3% 
and the rest was made up of semi-detached, row or terrace houses (ABS, 2005). Unfortunately, there do not 
appear to be internationally comparable data on the proportion of the population that live in high rise 
dwellings.12   
A number of internationally comparable indicators of population density could be used in this study.13 
The main alternatives are: 
• USKM is population per square kilometre. This is the standard measure, and 
• UURB which is the percent of the population that is urbanised from the United Nations (2004). 
The latter, UURB, is more highly correlated with broadband penetration than the traditional measure of 
USKM (see Table 2 and Annex 1b). 
4.9  Government variable (G) 
Governments can try to stimulate broadband penetration with subsidies or regulation. For example, in 
May 2006 the New Zealand government decreed unbundling of the local loop as a direct result of its poor 
ranking on broadband penetration rates. This study considered six measures of policy: 
• GUYRS is the number of years that unbundled local loop (ULL) has been available and is derived 
from the OECD (2005, Table 2.10). Half of the panel data for the earlier period is derived by 
subtracting three years from each value in the December 2005 data set. 
Of course, dates can be problematic  availability will lag legislation. But this measure is no less 
precise than using a dummy to reflect whether ULL is available or mandated, as some studies do 
(e.g. Grosso, 2006 and Garcia-Murillo 2003). In fact, GUYRS turns out to be the most useful of the 
proxies for government policy considered here.  
Wallsten (2006) used segmented information on unbundling for OECD countries, but he used a 
vector of three dummy variables (full unbundling, bit-stream and sub-loop) based on the 
regulatory environment at 2001 reported in Umino (2004). There are also dummies for price 
regulation and collocation policies and practices. In fact, the only continuous independent 
variables are for the demand shifters of fixed teledensity and GDP per capita.  
Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006) tried using both a dummy to test the effect of the 
existence of ULL and also the number of ULL lines. Only the latter is used in the estimation of 
broadband penetration and it is small and insignificant. A 10% increase in unbundled local loops 
leads to only a 1.25% increase in broadband penetration on their estimates.  
GUYRS has a statistically significant and positive relationship with QTOT (i.e. ULL promotes 
broadband penetration) and a negative relationship with PTOT (i.e. ULL is associated with lower 
broadband prices). On this measure, the United States has had ULL available for longer than 
other countries except Finland, but this has done more for Finland than the United States. 
The other four measures of government policy discussed below have much lower correlations 
with QTOT (Table 2 and Annex 1c). 
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• GADSL is another measure of regulatory intent. It is defined as the sum of entrants retail ADSL 
lines expressed as a percent of incumbent total ADSL lines and available at December 2005. The 
European data is sourced from ECTA.14 The paper also uses the authors estimates for Australia, 
New Zealand and the United States.15  This still leaves eight missing observations for Canada, 
Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey.   
• GUTOT is a measure of service-based competition defined as entrants lines based on incumbent 
copper (i.e. GADSL) as a percent of the total broadband market. This measure is negatively 
correlated with QTOT (see Table 2) which seems inconsistent with finding a positive relationship 
for GUYRS and is counter-intuitive as it suggests that service based competition does not assist 
broadband penetration. There are, however, seven missing values. 
GADSL and GUTOT both have a statistically significant and positive relationship with UURB. That is, 
a high share of entrants in the ADSL market is associated with high population density, as we 
would expect.  
• GBAR is an entry barrier index where a higher number reflects lower barriers. It is based on nine 
indicators collected in 1998 and aggregated through principal components analysis (Gual & 
Trillas 2006). There are 8 missing values. 
Bauer et al. (2003) tried a similar approach when they tested the importance of policy variables 
on broadband penetration. They used cluster analysis across unbundling policies, cross cable-
telco ownership restrictions and government funding for broadband to assign countries to one of 
three policy groups (Bauer, Table 2). But, this procedure was not very successful so this 
categorisation is not used here.  
• GOWN measures government ownership in the main fixed telephone operator. After reviewing the 
literature on the effects of ownership and competition on investment, Garcia-Murillo and Gable 
(2003) hypothesise that broadband subscription is positively correlated to the privatisation of the 
incumbent carrier. Of course, privatisation is usually associated with market liberalisation so this 
measure could be a proxy for competition. Neither GOWN nor the competition variables defined 
below are significantly correlated with QTOT. 
Although regional and remote areas might be expected to impact government policy, the relevant 
measure of policy in this context is not GUYRS (because full local loop unbundling will not be used in 
country areas) but either mandated wholesale access to some form of unbundled bit-stream access and/or 
subsidy arrangements. It has not been possible to identify cross-country data on subsidy programmes.  
4.10  Competition variable (C)  
Competition should drive broadband penetration. The number of suppliers is important but it is not 
usually reported. However, it may be even more important to distinguish between platform (primarily 
cable) and service- (unbundling and resale) based competition. The debate over the efficacy of ULL in 
promoting broadband adoption is also about which end of the facility versus service-based competition 
spectrum is best for broadband uptake.  
Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006) found significant effects from technological (platform) 
competition. They use a dummy variable to indicate the existence of competition between technologies. 
Since there was no OECD country that relied entirely on DSL for broadband access at December 2005, 
some threshold must apply16 or else their dummy is the same for all countries. They also find the number 
of 3G mobile operators to be a significant measure of competition for broadband coverage. 
DSTI/ICCP/CISP(2007)8/FINAL 
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• CFAC is measured as the share of non-DSL lines in QTOT. The higher this ratio is, the nearer the 
country is to the facilities-based end of the competition spectrum. Only three countries have a 
share higher than 50%: the United States, Canada and the Czech Republic (Annex 2). As 
expected, this measure is positively correlated with QTOT.  
A variant of this measure is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration using the shares of 
broadband access types instead of firm market shares (Cadman and Dineen, 2006; Grosso, 2006). 
As shown by Figure 4, there is not much difference between this index (based on OECD data) 
and CFAC.   
• CCAB is narrower in scope than CFAC being the share of cable in QTOT. 
• CENT is 1 minus the share of the broadband market accounted for at the retail level by the 
incumbent fixed carrier. The main source is ECTA (which reports only European countries) 
supplemented by the authors estimates for Australia, Canada, Korea, Norway and the United 
States with Iceland, Japan, Switzerland and Turkey treated as missing observations.  
Figure 4: The HHI and CFAC compared (December 2005) 
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While all these measures are positively correlated with QTOT (see Table 2 and Annex 1d), the 
correlations are very weak despite some tautology (all the measures are significant components of QTOT). 
However, CFAC does seem important in the country commentary (Table 5) and is significant in the 
differenced data set (Table 7). 
5. December 2005 data set 
The data set for December 2005 tests the suitability of a large range of possible explanatory variables. 
The maximum sample size is only 30 but it appears to yield better results than other samples of the same 
size (e.g. Bauer et al. 2001 and Turner 2005).  
The first three columns of Table 4 show results for demand and supply equations estimated 
independently while the last two columns are results for a composite equation.  
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The estimated equations give some comfort that just a few key variables can explain much of the 
variation in broadband penetration rates.  
Table 4: Results of some OLS estimations (Dec. 2005) 
Dependent variable: total broadband penetration (QTOT)
1 2 3 4 5
Demand
Price LNPTOT -1.980    
(2.96)**    
LNPDSL -1.865
(2.84)**
LNPREL  -1.978 -2.366 -3.572
 (3.27)** (4.88)** (6.19)**
GDP per capita YINDEX 0.261 0.079 -1.099
(0.07) (0.02) (0.31)
Age AGE 0.534 0.598 0.725 0.521 0.917
(1.11) (1.24) (1.57) (1.47) (1.93)*
Education ETERT 0.084 0.092 0.131   
(0.80) (0.88) (1.37)   
Saturation SIP 0.352 0.352 0.338 0.296  
(3.94)** (3.90)** (3.87)** (4.94)**  
Weather SUN -0.173 -0.197 -0.007
(0.27) (0.31) (0.01)
Constant -4.798 -6.751 -17.321
(0.0.33) (0.47) (1.34)
Observations 30 30 30
Adjusted R-squared 0.770 0.765 0.784
Supply
Price LNPDSL -2.790
(3.76)**
Urbanisation UURB 0.316 0.349 0.354 0.194 0.302
(4.09)** (3.71)** (3.81)** (3.41)** (4.17)**
Competition CFAC 0.057 0.043  
(1.12) (0.70)
Policy GUYRS 0.574 1.285 1.333   
(1.65) (3.60)** (3.84)**   
Constant -5.348 -19.592 -19.019 -22.724 -35.332
(0.77) (2.73)** (2.69)* (2.24)* (2.61)**
Observations 30 30 30 30 30
Adjusted R-squared 0.672 0.507 0.517 0.852 0.720
 
Note.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
 Statistical significance at the 5 and 1% denoted by * and **. 
In Table 5, those countries that are more than one standard deviation from the mean broadband 
penetration rate are identified at the top of the table. About one third of OECD countries are in this 
category, shown as worst and best performers. Using this country selection, Table 5 then goes on to 
report which of these countries is greater than one standard deviation from the mean of the key explanatory 
variables identified. If a country has such a deviation on a variable that would promote broadband 
penetration (e.g. low prices), it is shown in the advantaged column. If the deviation would have the 
opposite influence (e.g. high prices) the country is shown as disadvantaged. 
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Table 5: Macro-correlations - the best and the worst (Dec. 2005) 
 
Best performers (1)
B'band Penetration (2)
GRC Greece DNK Denmark
HUN Hungary FIN Finland
MEX Mexico ISL Iceland
POL Poland KOR Korea
SVK Slovak Republic NLD Netherlands
TUR Turkey NOR Norway
CHE Switzerland
Advantaged (1)
Price (LN forms) FIN, KOR
Income (YINDEX) NOR
Education (ETERT)
Weather (SUN)
Saturation (SIP)
Urbanisation (UURB)
Policy (GUYRS)
Competition (CFAC) KORGRC, ISL (3), TUR
Worst performers (1)
Disadvantaged (1)
HUN, MEX, SVK, TUR
GRC, HUN, MEX, POL, SVK, TUR DNK, NLD, NOR, CHE
GRC, FIN (3), POL, SVK DNK, ISL
HUN, MEX, POL, SVK, TUR
MEX, POL, SVK, TUR DNK, FIN, NOR
GRC, KOR (3), MEX ISL, NLD
MEX, SVK, CHE (3), TUR DNK, FIN, NLD
 
Notes: (1) Further than one standard deviation from the mean.  
 (2) Only these countries are considered in the remainder of the table. 
 (3) These are "disadvantaged" countries which have high penetration. 
None of the worst performers have any advantages. Mexico and Turkey are the most disadvantaged 
with six citations each across the eight explanatory variables. The most advantaged country is Denmark 
which is cited against four variables with no negative citations.17 
While neither Australia nor New Zealand is among the countries just discussed, both lie more than 
one standard deviation from the mean on some of the explanatory variables. Australia is disadvantaged on 
weather (the sun creates its famous outdoor culture) and advantaged on urbanisation (which could be due 
to poor measurement of urbanisation as noted earlier). New Zealand is advantaged on the education 
measure and disadvantaged on policy (ULL is only now being introduced) and competition (DSL accounts 
for almost 90% of broadband access).18 
6. Panel data set 
The panel includes the December 2005 data except that the price variable relates only to DSL prices 
because only DSL prices are available for both periods in the panel data set. The panel dummy variable set 
to 1 for December 2005 data and set to 0 for the earlier corresponding data.  
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The earlier panel data is for December 2002 with the following exclusions: 
• The penetration rate for Korea has been treated as a missing value. Koreas penetration rate is 
more than twice as high as the next highest country (Canada) and including it would have skewed 
the distribution of QTOT making OLS estimation results unacceptable. 
• The Internet penetration rate (SIP) for Portugal in the early period has been treated as a missing 
value given the reporting issues discussed above. 
• DSL prices for Turkey in the early period are excluded. Turkeys DSL prices in that period are 
more than treble those of the next highest prices (Mexico).  
• There are also three missing DSL price points in the early period for the Czech Republic, Greece 
and the Slovak Republic. None of them had broadband service in July 2003. 
The OLS estimation results are presented in Table 6. The first three columns show results for demand 
and supply equations estimated independently while the last two columns are results for a composite 
equation. 
Not surprisingly, the panel dummy variable is highly significant showing a mean jump in broadband 
penetration of around 7 percentage points between the two periods.  
Comparing Table 6 with Table 4 shows no surprises. The demand equations show again the 
importance of price and the size of the addressable market (SIP) with support for AGE. But GDP per capita 
is not significant as a measure of income.   
Comparing Table 6 with Table 4 on the supply side, the price variable is again incorrectly signed 
suggesting that the observed relationship between broadband penetration and price is tracing-out the 
demand curve. The level of urbanisation is again a highly significant supply factor and strong support is 
found for ULL (GUYRS) as a key explanatory variable. The role of platform competition (CFAC) is still 
difficult to confirm.  
7. Differenced data 
While the variables considered in this paper can explain some of the difference in broadband 
penetration rates across countries, it must be recognised that there may be country-specific factors that will 
affect broadband uptake and which are not captured by the variables examined in this study. But, there is a 
simple technique which washes-out country fixed effects. That is, assuming that the excluded, unique 
country factors do not vary between the two periods in the panel data set, subtracting the values in the 
earlier period from those in the later period yields a new differenced data set where country-specific factors 
have been eliminated.19 
DSTI/ICCP/CISP(2007)8/FINAL 
 18
Table 6: Results of some OLS estimations (Panel data) 
Dependent variable: total broadband penetration (QTOT)
1 2 3 4 5
Demand
Price LNPDSL  -2.017 -1.993 -2.023 -2.233
 (5.69)** (5.49)** (5.84)** (5.43)**
LNPREL -1.549
(3.94)**
GDP per capita YINDEX -1.44  
(0.59)  
Age AGE 0.505 0.522 0.440 0.652
(1.56) (1.90)* (1.71)* (2.15)*
Education ETERT 0.117     
(1.76)*     
Saturation SIP 0.247 0.277 0.302 0.215  
(4.20)** (6.89)** (7.71)** (4.69)**  
Weather SUN -0.085     
(0.21)     
Dummy DUMMY 7.610 7.349 7.286
(7.33)** (7.90)** (7.64)**
Constant -15.368 -8.481 5.823
(1.70)* (1.09) (2.93)**
Observations 55 54 54
Adjusted R-squared 0.816 0.839 0.831
Supply
Price LNPDSL -2.131  
(5.05)**  
Urbanisation UURB 0.255 0.249 0.295 0.134 0.218
(5.44)** (4.58)** (4.48)** (3.20)** (4.81)**
Competition CFAC 0.033  0.030  
(1.52)  (0.99)  
Policy GUYRS 0.596 0.970  0.094 0.469
(3.17)** (4.82)**  (0.54) (2.51)*
Dummy DUMMY 7.215 7.488 11.054 7.288 6.732
(5.98)** (5.68)** (7.13)** (7.87)** (6.13)**
Constant -9.447 -16.704 -19.740 -15.075 -23.006
(2.07)* (4.05)** (3.53)** (2.01)* (2.63)*
Observations 54 54 58 54 54
Adjusted R-squared 0.794 0.683 0.557 0.862 0.802
 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
 Statistical significance at the 5 and 1% denoted by * and **. 
Of course, differencing means that some key factors from Tables 4 and 6 such as education, weather 
and urbanisation which do not vary between periods are differenced out of the equations. And, the GUYRS 
policy variable drops out too because the difference in years of unbundling takes the same value (i.e. 3) for 
all countries. 
The estimated results for the demand, supply and composite equations are presented in Table 7. 
Comparing these results with Tables 4 and 6, price and market size (SIP) are still significant and platform 
competition (CFAC) becomes highly significant.  
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Table 7: Results of some OLS estimations (Difference data) 
Dependent variable: total broadband penetration (DQTOT)
1 2 3
Demand
Price LNDPREL -0.473   
(0.21)   
LNDPDSL  -1.053 -1.456
 (1.08) (2.04)*
GDP per capita DYINDEX -47.619 -41.613  
(1.31) (1.20)  
Saturation DSIP 0.798 0.740 0.733
(1.754)* (1.79)* (2.38)*
Constant 6.686 5.710
(3.40)** (2.74)**
Observations 24 25
Adjusted R-squared 0.095 0.144
Supply
Price LNDPDSL -1.785  
(2.38)*  
Competition DCFAC 0.119 0.120
(4.11)** (4.48)**
Constant 10.128 7.728
(7.35)** (4.74)**
Observations 25 24
Adjusted R-squared 0.427 0.523
 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
 Statistical significance at the 5 and 1% denoted by * and **. 
8. Conclusions 
There is a consistent pattern across all the results presented here in terms of what drives broadband 
penetration. The new pricing data in this study yield more significant price effects than some previous 
studies (Table 1).  The size of the addressable market (SIP) and age profile of the population were also 
found to be significant demand drivers.  
Surprisingly, GDP per capita was not found to be statistically significant.20 Future research should 
consider whether a broader set of internationally comparable income data yield the same results. 
Weather is not a variable that has been considered before in any broadband penetration study. 
Although statistically significant coefficients were not found for SUN, Tables 2 and 5 suggest weather 
could be a demand driver and should be considered in future studies; perhaps testing rain and temperature 
as alternative weather variables.  
On the supply side, urbanisation proved to be significant, as expected. However, it was difficult to 
establish strong competition effects. However, as broadband mobile and wireless Internet platforms 
become more widely deployed, it should be possible to revisit the impact of facilities based competition on 
broadband.21 
While the number of years that ULL has been available (GUYRS) proved significant, it is a rather 
simplistic measure of government policy. Unfortunately, the wealth of data on different forms of 
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unbundling and alternative broadband platforms that is published by ECTA for European countries is not 
yet available for the rest of the OECD countries.  
This paper has not been able to look at other government policies, such as subsidies and taxes. These 
could affect the deployment and uptake of broadband. These factors may be more easily addressed through 
country case studies than international comparisons due to the paucity of comparable data. 
Data is available to examine DSL and Cable penetration rates separately. The former is the dominant 
form of supply currently. Any research on the impact of unbundling policies should focus on DSL rather 
than overall broadband penetration.    
The results of this paper suggest that the key variables driving broadband penetration rates are either 
exogenous (e.g. urbanisation) or they are general economic factors (e.g. market size and education). The 
analysis also supports the contention that unbundling (as measured by GUYRS) is currently more significant 
than platform competition in explaining broadband penetration.  This fact suggests that if platform 
competition does not materialise, government or regulatory policy aimed at increasing broadband 
penetration rates should focus on determining the appropriate pricing structure for the unbundled local loop 
or consider the use of subsidies to increase broadband infrastructure or penetration rates. 
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ANNEX 1A: BROADBAND PENETRATION AND PRICE (DECEMBER 2005) 
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ANNEX 1B: BROADBAND PENETRATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES (DEC. 2005) 
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ANNEX 1C: BROADBAND PENETRATION AND POLICY VARIABLES (DEC. 2005) 
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ANNEX 1D: BROADBAND PENETRATION AND COMPETITION VARIABLES (DEC. 2005) 
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ANNEX 1E: BROADBAND PENETRATION AND MARKET VARIABLES (DEC. 2005) 
 
 
 
 
DSTI/ICCP/CISP(2007)8/FINAL 
 28
 
ANNEX 2: TABLE OF DECEMBER 2005 DATA 
 
QTOT PTOT PDSL PREL YINDEX AGE ETERT SIP SUN UURB GUYRS CFAC
AUS     Australia               13.78 33.70 37.40 1.54 0.79 28.40 31.00 26.55 6.70 88.20 6.00 21.91
AUT     Austria                 14.13 24.99 37.84 0.88 0.79 30.10 15.00 32.03 5.10 66.00 7.00 42.60
BEL     Belgium                 18.26 14.95 20.06 0.56 0.76 29.30 29.00 19.51 3.90 97.20 5.00 38.22
CAN     Canada                  20.99 11.33 15.42 1.05 0.79 30.50 44.00 23.30 5.40 80.10 9.00 51.78
CZE     Czech Rep.          6.37 196.81 269.53 9.33 0.44 27.90 12.00 20.86 5.20 73.50 2.00 52.46
DNK     Denmark                 24.99 16.25 17.32 0.75 0.76 28.70 32.00 51.23 4.40 85.60 8.00 38.73
FIN     Finland                 22.46 3.40 2.84 0.10 0.66 29.30 33.00 34.77 5.00 61.10 10.00 13.24
FRA     France                  15.22 3.28 3.24 0.10 0.70 27.30 23.00 19.15 5.00 76.70 5.00 5.98
DEU     Germany                 12.98 9.00 9.09 0.46 0.72 30.60 24.00 27.89 4.90 75.20 8.00 2.86
GRC     Greece                  1.41 70.24 70.24 2.80 0.51 27.30 18.00 7.66 7.70 59.00 5.00 0.91
HUN     Hungary                 6.33 79.53 97.66 2.80 0.37 27.70 15.00 7.34 5.20 66.30 4.00 35.44
ISL     Iceland                 26.66 11.89 11.89 0.22 0.77 27.30 26.00 33.33 3.50 92.80 6.00 2.72
IRL     Ireland                 6.67 32.73 35.08 0.97 0.85 26.60 26.00 27.76 3.80 60.50 5.00 25.27
ITA     Italy                   11.86 16.31 16.31 0.76 0.66 28.80 10.00 17.75 6.70 67.60 5.00 4.93
JPN     Japan                   17.63 1.11 1.29 0.05 0.64 26.50 37.00 26.48 5.70 65.80 9.00 35.68
KOR     Korea                   25.35 0.85 1.07 0.10 0.46 30.90 29.00 25.02 6.90 80.80 4.00 46.22
LUX     Luxembourg            14.90 37.76 40.04 0.94 1.60 32.10 15.00 23.74 3.90 82.80 5.00 10.89
MEX     Mexico                  2.21 125.41 110.93 5.74 0.24 29.00 15.00 3.05 7.00 76.00 0.00 30.18
NLD     Netherlands            25.28 10.89 12.84 0.39 0.81 30.10 24.00 44.07 4.20 80.20 8.00 37.98
NZL     New Zealand          8.10 34.83 36.21 2.86 0.61 28.20 31.00 24.01 5.50 86.20 0.00 10.27
NOR     Norway                  21.93 16.60 18.63 0.42 0.94 28.30 31.00 36.96 4.50 77.40 5.00 18.65
POL     Poland                  2.35 26.13 31.97 1.53 0.28 28.60 14.00 6.58 4.60 62.10 3.00 32.31
PRT     Portugal                11.52 12.66 13.89 0.37 0.45 28.10 11.00 14.00 8.30 57.60 5.00 42.44
SVK     Slovak Rep.        2.49 104.51 115.28 4.57 0.32 28.80 12.00 7.39 5.70 56.20 0.00 21.58
ESP     Spain                   11.70 69.08 79.33 3.14 0.64 28.60 25.00 13.69 7.70 76.70 5.00 21.60
SWE     Sweden                  20.35 2.99 2.42 0.10 0.74 27.10 33.00 36.59 5.40 84.20 5.00 34.43
CHE     Switzerland             23.06 25.82 28.61 1.05 0.82 30.30 27.00 41.59 5.20 75.20 0.00 36.36
TUR     Turkey                  2.13 148.67 148.96 7.91 0.17 23.00 10.00 2.10 6.70 67.30 0.00 1.96
GBR     United Kingdom      16.42 32.42 37.03 1.27 0.78 27.70 28.00 25.25 4.00 89.70 5.00 29.00
USA     United States          16.80 14.06 16.89 1.13 1.00 28.70 38.00 33.02 7.10 80.80 10.00 61.47
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Mean 14.14 39.61 44.64 1.79 0.67 28.53 24.07 23.76 5.50 74.96 4.97 26.94
Std. Deviation 7.92 47.78 56.94 2.31 0.27 1.70 9.42 12.47 1.30 11.07 2.97 16.93  
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NOTES 
 
1  Adoption of broadband has been explored with other data sets such as US States data (Aron and Burnstein, 
2003; Denni and Gruber, 2005) and for the EU-15 (Distaso et al., 2006). 
2  Both competition and policy may be endogenous too but it is hard to find any direct influence from either 
on broadband penetration so having to explain them within the model would be too ambitious. 
3  It is important for the measures of correlation and the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates that there are 
straight-line relationships between the variables. 
4  The data for DSL enabled loops is for either 2002 or 2003 and is taken from the OECD (2002, Table 5). 
The figure for Australia is 87% and represents potential supply compared with less than 7% of lines 
actually providing DSL service. 
5  This coefficient lies between 0 and 1 where the latter means the relationship between the two variables lies 
on a straight line. 
6  In a normal distribution, 95% of observations will fall between the mean plus or minus 1.96 standard 
deviations. 
7  By definition, the possible range of values for QTOT is bounded by zero and 100%. This might suggest the 
use of a Tobit model, which would allow for the logistic shape of broadband penetration, rather than using 
least squares (OLS) regression. However, broadband penetration rates are concentrated between 1 and 25% 
(as shown in Figures 1 and 2), so OLS is a good approximation.  
8  The OECD stopped reporting the dial-up costs of Internet access in 2002. 
9  For December 2005, the correlation coefficient between YINDEX and EYRS and ETERT  is 0.619 and 0.399 
respectively. 
10  The ITU reports higher subscriber numbers in 2002 than 2004 for Germany, Portugal, Turkey and the 
United States, which seems unlikely.  
11  From http://www.bbc.co.uk/weather/world/country_guides/  which also has temperature data. Capital city 
data are not considered too limited when the greatest broadband penetration rates are found there too. 
12  A detailed study on the impact of population density on the cost of service to-date was done by the 
Productivity Commission in Australia (Cribbett, 2000). This study normalised population density 
distributions to a consistent low level of aggregation. Then, average line costs for Australia, New Zealand, 
Finland and the US States of Alaska, California, Oregon and Washington were estimated using line density 
distributions and a common cost function. It found that low line density areas, defined as less than two 
services per square kilometre, accounted for 25% of the costs of providing local service in Australia 
compared with 5% in California. 
13  Other population/urbanisation measures considered were: 
• The population inside the most populated 10% of regions from Table 1.1 of the OECDs Regions at 
a Glance. On this measure, Australia is counted as the most geographically concentrated country 
with 10% of regions accounting for 64% of the population; compared with about 34% on average for 
the OECD. This reflects the vast tracts of land that are sparsely populated in Australia. 
• The index from Table 1.1 of the same OECD publication showing geographic concentration that 
offers a more accurate picture of the spatial distribution of the population, as it takes into account 
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the area of each region. Again, Australia is counted as densely populated at 0.8 compared with an 
OECD average of 0.4. 
• The variances in regional population densities from Table 1.3 of the same OECD publication; which 
are marked. The highest population density is in Paris with 20 356 people per sq km. The population 
density in Sydney and Melbourne is less than 500 per square kilometre compared with Koreas 
17 000 plus in Seoul and over 2 500 in each of Pusan, Taegu, Incheon and Kwangju. 
• The urban population density from Table 1.4 in the OECD publication which  finds that only 55% of 
Australias population is urban compared with 88% on the United Nations definition of urbanisation. 
But the OECD average in Table 1.4 is not much different from Australias at 53% so this definition 
of population density is no improvement over UURB. 
14  ECTAs Broadband Scorecards are at http://www.ectaportal.com/en/basic276.html with the earliest at 
September 2004. Its ADSL numbers are used for GADSL rather than the OECDs if they differ slightly. 
15  The FCC reports the number of lines provided with and without switching. Assuming the latter (UNE-L) is 
used to support broadband, there were 4.3m ULL lines or 10% of all broadband services at June 2005. 
16  For example, in 13 countries, cable accounted for less than two percentage points of total broadband 
penetration. 
17  It is interesting to note that Denmark leapt to the top of the broadband penetration ranking in June 2006.  
18  Also, Howell (2006) points out that relatively cheap dial-up prices are a factor in New Zealand. Only the 
Czech Republic, Mexico, the Slovak Republic, Spain and Turkey have higher values of LNPREL than 
New Zealand. On the results presented in this paper, reducing LNPREL to the OECD mean would have 
increased New Zealands penetration rate 2.0 to 4.4% above its 8.1% level. 
19  Some other studies have also used fixed effects transformations (Gross 2006, Wallsten 2006).   
20  Cava-Fuerruruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006) found this variable to be the most relevant variable for both 
the estimation of both DSL and cable coverage (p453). But for our dependant variable, per capita 
broadband penetration, it does not appear in either their estimated model (p457) or correlation matrix 
(p458). Bauer et al. (2003) obtained a negative coefficient on income, which is contrary to expectations. 
21  As at December 2005, only Denmark, Japan, Korea and Sweden had higher than 2% penetration in 
technologies other than DSL and cable. 
